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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, • • 
Plaintiff-Respondent, • • 
-v- • Case No. 18151 • 
OON A. ELTON, ,, . • • 
Defendant-Appellant. • • 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF ON REHEARING 
In accordance with this Court's request for 
additional briefing discussing the effect of Utah Code Ann., 
S 76-2-101 and 102 (1953), as amended, on Utah Code Ann., 
§ 76-5-401 in the case of State v. Elton, Case No. 18151, 
respondent submits the following arguments (A copy of the 
opinion is attached as Appendix "A".). 
Elton, 
ARGUMENT 
/ 
POINT I 
UTAR CODE ANN., § 76-5-401 (1953), AS 
AMENDED, IMPOSES STRICT LIABILITY. 
The opinion already issued in this case, State v. 
P.2d (Case No. 18151, decided September 10, 
1982), clearly indicates that this Court has no doubt as to 
the Legislature's intent to make the crime of unlawful sexual 
intercourse, defined in § 76-5-401, a strict liability 
offense. Therefore, it is not necessary to reiterate here the 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
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 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
arguments and ci tatio=~s included in r~spondent 's original 
brief which support that conclusion. The request for 
additional briefing suggests that the Court is, however, 
concerned about the textual inconsistency between the 
provisions of the three criminal Code sections cited above. 
Respondent will address that issue. 
Section 76-2-101 provides: 
No person is guilty of an offense 
unless his conduct is prohibited by law 
and: 
(1) He acts intentionally, knowingly, 
recklessly or with criminal negligence 
with respect to each element of the 
offense as the definition of the offense 
requires; or 
(2) His acts constitute an offense 
involving strict liability. 
Section 76-2-102 reads: 
Every offense not involving strict 
liability shall require a culpable mental 
state, and when the definition of the 
offense does not specify a culpable mental 
state, intent, knowledge, or recklessness 
shall suffice to establish criminal 
responsibility. An offense shall involve 
strict liability only when a statute 
defining the offense clearly indicates a 
legislative purpose to impose strict 
liability for the conduct by use of the 
phrase "strict liability" or other terms 
of similar import. 
Finally, § 76-5-401 defines unlawful sexual intercourse as 
follows: 
-2-
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(1) A male person commits unlawful 
sexual intercourse if he has sexual 
intercourse with a female, not his wife, 
who is under sixteen years of age. 
(2) Unlawful sexual intercourse is a 
felo·ny of the third degree except when at 
the time of intercourse the male is no 
more than three years older than the 
female, in which case it is a class B 
misdemeanor. · Evidence that the actor was 
not more than three years older than the 
victim at the time of the intercourse 
shall be raised by the defendant. 
It is immediately apparent that § 76-5-401 does not 
contain the "phrase 'strict liability' or other terms of 
similar import," as is required by §·76-2-102 to make a crime 
a strict liability offense. The question, therefore, is what 
effect the.failure of § 76-5-401 to comport with the 
requirements of §§ 76-2-101 and 102 has on the operation of 
that statute as one imposing strict liability. 
First, given the wide agreement in this country's 
courts that statutory rape is a strict liability crime, there 
is no reason to believe that the Legislature intended that 
§ 76-5-401 be anything but a strict liability statute. As 
already noted, this Court has accepted that conclusion. In 
State v. Elton, supra, at 1, it said: 
••• Utah courts, as elsewhere, 
traditionally have considered and approved 
sanctions for offenses like that charged 
here, connoting a "strict liability" that 
is implicit in the offense itself, whether 
those words are included in the 
legislation defining the offense or not. 
-3-
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Therefore, if this Court were s~ictly to follow S 76-1-102 
and require that "intent, knowledge, or recklessness" be shown 
to establish criminal responsibility under § 76-5-401, which 
admittedly neither uses words imposing strict liability nor 
specifies a culpable men~al state, it would frustrate an 
obvious legislative purpose to impose strict liability for the 
offense of unlawful sexual intercourse. 
Unlawful sexual intercourse, as defined in S 76-5-
401, is precisely the type of crime in which legislatures and 
courts across the country have historically imposed strict 
liability because of the nature of the act. In State v. 
Superior Court of Pima County, Ariz., 454 P.2d 982 (1969), the 
Arizona Supreme Court outlined the history of such crimes, 
stating: 
••• [w]e feel compelled to first observe 
that the social consequences of 
legislative action is not ordinarily a 
matter with which courts are concerned. 
It is sufficient to say that the 
constitutional justification for criminal 
responsibility lies in the recognition 
that a female under the age of eighteen 
years, although physically mature, may be 
mentally and emotionally incapable of 
making a proper value judgment. The 
statute is bottomed on the premise that 
those who deal with the young must do so 
at their peril and are strictly 
accountable for their conduct. 
454 P.2d at 984. The Court analyzed and rejected the 
Hernandez decision, as did this Court in its original opinion 
-4-
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in this case, stating: 
It is true, as stated by the Supreme 
Court of California, that the courts have 
uniformly failed to satisfactorily explain 
the nature of the criminal intent present 
in the minds of one who, in good faith, 
believes he has obtained a lawful consent 
before engaging in the prohibited act. 
But this is immaterial. The offense here 
is of that class which, by reason of an 
unbroken line of judicial holdings, it can 
be said that the statute denounces the 
mere doing of the act as criminal, 
regardless of whether the perpetrator had 
a bad mind, the generalized intent to 
engage in a course of criminal conduct ••• 
454 P.2d at 985 (Emphasis anned). There can be no doubt that 
the Utah Legislature intended that unlawful sexual intercourse 
fall within the class of crimes in which strict liability is 
imposed. The statute is intended to protect persons under the 
age of sixteen. This Court in its opinion in this case 
recognized- the purpose behi~d such a statute: "Courts have 
taken the position that a statute calling for the protection 
of younq women below a specific age is necessary and 
contributive to the common welfare." State v. Elton, supra, 
at p. 2 of the opinion. 
Section 76-5-401 can be compared to then Section 
41-6-44.2 (1953). prohibiting driving while under the influence 
of alcohol. In Greaves v. State, Utah, 528 P.2d 805, 807 n. 5 
(1974), this Court held that such offense falls within the 
class of offenses characterized by strict liability, even 
-5-
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though the definition of the offense did not and does not use 
the phrase •strict liability" or othe~ similar terms. This is 
just one example of several offenses in which the Legislature 
has imposed strict liability without using the phrase or any 
similar phrase. See, e.g. § 76-5-402 (1981 Supp.), [rape]; 
S 76-5-403 ( 1981 Supp.),· [sodomy and forcible sodomy]; and 
several others. This Court did not hold the failure to use 
the phrase "strict liability" precluded interpreting the 
offense as one imposing strict liability and this ruling 
should apply here. 
In drafting S 76-5-401, the Legislature simply 
overlooked the necessity of including words expressly denoting 
strict liability in order for that section to be consistent 
with s 76-2-102. In short, the Legislature left a gap in the 
statute. Faced with a similar •gap" in State v. Wood, Utah, 
648 P.2d 71 (1982), this Court did not hesitate to fill it. 
There, the Legislature had failed to specify in Utah Code 
Ann., § 76-3-207 (1953), as ame~ded, the requisite standard of 
persuasion to be applied in the sentencing phase of a capital 
case. Citing In re Boyer, Utah, 636 P.2d 1085, 1091 (1982), 
the Court said: 
when the Legislature has not specified the 
requisite standard of persuasion or 
certitude necessary in an adjudication, it 
is the duty of the Court to fill such a 
gap by weighing the relative.int7rests of 
the State and the defendant in light of 
potential constitutional considerations 
and legislative intent to determine what 
the degree of persuasion ought to be. 
648 P.2d at 83 (Emphasis added). 
-6-
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The Wood Court relied on the general standards 
contained in S 76-1-104 and S 76-1-106 for guidance in 
construing the criminal code and as a basis for filling a gap 
in the statute. Section 76-1-106 provides: 
The rule that a penal statute is to 
be strictly construed shall not apply to 
this code, any of its provisions, or any 
offense defined by the laws of this state. 
All provisions of this code and offenses 
defined by the laws of this state shall be 
construed according to the fair import of 
their terms to promote justice and to 
effect the object of the law and general 
purposes of Section 76-1-104. 
§ 76-1-104 reads in pertinent part: 
The provisions of this code shall be 
construed in accordance with these general 
purposes. 
(1) Forbid and prevent the commission of 
offenses; 
(2) Define adequately the conduct and 
mental state which constitute each offense 
and safeguard conduct that is without 
fault from condemnation as criminal. 
Just as they did in Wood, supra, these provisions provide the 
vehicle in the instant case for this Court to fill the gap in 
a criminal statute and thereby construe it in such a way as to 
fulfill the purposes of the criminal code. Moreover, in Wood, 
this Court proceeded to specify the requisite standard of 
persuasion for capital sentencing--the textual absence of 
which it perceived represented a gap in § 76-3-207--even in 
the face of considerable evidence that the Legislature may 
-7-
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well have intended there be no such burden of persuasion 
requirement. Thus, the Court should have little difficulty 
proceeding to specify a standard of strict liability for the 
offense defined in § 76-5-401, where the Legislature's failure 
to include specific words denoting strict liability is most 
reasonably interpreted as but an unfortunate oversight. 
CONCLUSION 
It is a long-standing rule in Utah that in the 
construction of a statute, the Court must be controlled by the 
evident purpose of the Legislature to attain a certain end. 
State v. Navaro, 83 Utah 6, 26 P.2d 955 (1933). In arriving 
at legislative intent, a court should consider the purposes 
sought to be accomplished through enactment of a particular 
statute. State v. Helm, Utah, 563 P.2d 794 (1977): Utah Farm 
Bureau Ins. Co. v. Utah Ins. G. Association, Utah, 564 P.2d 
751 (1977). Insuring proper effect to legislative intent and 
purpose is a primary consideration. Parson Asphalt 
Production, Inc. v. Utah State Tax Commission, Utah, 617 P.2d 
397 (1980): Millett v. Clark Clinic Corp., Utah, 609 P.2d 934 
(1980). Thus, a statute should not be construed or applied so 
as to result in incongruous results which were never intended. 
Snyder v. Clune, 15 Utah 2d 254, 390 P.2d 915 (1964). 
Accordingly, a conclusion by this Court that the Legislature 
intended that S 76-5-401 impose strict liability, and that the 
-8-
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Court, in construing the statute, may proceed to fill a gap 
·. 
therein (per the reasoning of Wood, supra) in order to insure 
proper effect to legislative intent, is entirely consistent 
with the law of this state. The intended imposition of strict 
liability for a violation of § 76-5-401 is, therefore, not 
affected by that statute's technical inconsistency with 
SS 76-2-101 and 102. 
Respectfully submitted this 22nd day of November, 
1982. 
DAVID L. WILKINSON 
Attorney Gen~l. ~ ............... ~ 
ROBERT N. PARRISH 
Assistant Attorney General 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed two true and exact 
copies of the foregoing Brief, postage prepaid, to Kent o. 
/ 
Willis, Attorney for Appellant, 43 East 200 North, P.O. Box 
•L", Provo, Utah, 84601, this 22nd day of November, 1982. 
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
State of Utah, 
-----00000-----, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, . 
v. 
Don A. Elton, 
Defendant and .. A~pellant. 
---
PER CURIAM: 
·. 
No. 18151 
FILED 
September 10, 1982 
Geoffrey J. Butler, Clerk 
The defendant, 19, had sexual intercourse with a 
14-year-old female, not his wife, and was foun~ guilty 
by a jury of violating u.c.A., 1953, 76-5-401. 
The offense is a third-degree felony, punishable by 
up to five years in prison. The trial court spared 
defendant the prison term, conditioned on a probationary 
completion of a half-way house program. 
Defendant urges three points on appeal to the 
effect that (1) the offense charged requires a specific 
criminal intent, (2) his mistake in. appraising the girl's 
age constitutes a defense to the charge, and (3) failure 
to allow evidence as to defendant's "belief" or "mistake" 
as to the girl's age, together with failure to instruct 
thereon, was error. ~ 
, Defendant concedes that Utah courts, as 
elsewhere, traditionally have considered and approved 
sanctions for offenses like that charged here, connoting 
a "strict liability" that is implicit in the offense 
itself, whether those words are included in the legislation 
defining the offense or not. Such offenses have been con-
sidered to be punishable without the necessity of pleading 
or proving specific intent. Since they are malum prohibitum 
crimes, criminal responsibility attaches whenever the pro-
hibited act is fully accomplished. 
The defendant's whole thesis is to the effect 
that it would be ludicrous if the legislature intended that 
one be guilty of a felony if the sex act occurred shortly 
before a girl's sixteenth birthday, but guilty only of a 
misdemeanor if it happened a few minutes after that magic 
date. Irrespective of such hypothetics, defendant contends 
that he should be excused from criminal liability if he 
"believed" or was •mistaken" as to the girl's age. 
1. "A person commits unlawful sexual intercourse if .that 
person has sexual intercourse with a person, not that person's 
spouse, who. is under sixteen years of age." 
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·J <· ..... 
, · .,. · · _::. ;. -~<Courts. generally\ have no~ --~- "----~~:-~·.~:~:_ -~~-~:-~r-"_~'93'J ....,...., 
·:defendant's c~ncepts -as to what the A!\~ enouJ.a ~e j Ae!!.~!.img ~nm t 
.,determination. to _the legislature. Courts have taken the 
position that a .statute calling for the protection of young 
-women below a specific age is necessary and contributive 
·.to the common' welfare. In rare instances, where one may not 
have intended to do violence because of belief or mistake, the 
~~aw.•is~ly bas provided a mitigating process.· This mitigating 
·and ·ameliorating process has -been employed in ~his very case in 
~the .sentencing phase, where the trial court placed _the defendant 
.on.probation rather-than impose a prison term •. 
... • • • ,. • • ·~ • .;'i. ... 
: ::. ~·: :·f .. -~ ·~_>· ·-. ·: _' =·· : The defendant cites. but one case supporting bis contention 
~-_that his· own subjective belief that the girl 1as 16 or over, should 
·constitute a defense to ~he statutory charge. This case has 
been rejected in numerous other jurisdictions. We agree in such 
·rejection and quote with approval language found in the following 
two well~reasone~ _opinions apropos to the questions ~aised here: 
- ,,, . - !" . 
The arbitrary age of consent ~n these 
- cases has been established by our 
·.legislature as a matter of public policy 
for the obvious protection of young and 
immature females·. . We cannot properly make 
exceptions. Therefor~, in a. prosecution 
for alleged statutory rape a defendant's 
knowledge of the age of the girl involved 
is immaterial and .his reasonable belief 
·:that she is ovsr the age of eighteen years 
. is no defense. -:(Citations omitted.] _ 
Petitioner claims that his honest belief 
c:that the prosecutrix of the statutory rape 
charge was over· 16 years o~ age should 
constitute a defense, of .. constitutional 
dimensions, to __ e;tatutory rape •.. The effect 
. of mens rea and mistake on state criminal 
1aw has generally been left to the--._· 
discretion·of the sta~es. Tbe Supreme 
__ Court has never beld that an honest mistake 
.as to ~he age of the prosecutrix ls a 
ccnstitutional defense to statutory rape, -
and nothing in the Court's recent decisions 
-.. clarifying the scope of procreative privacy_ 
suggests that a state may no longer place 
. the risk of ·mistake as to· the prosecutrix's 
.. ·age on the person engaging in sexual 
;:: intercourse with a partner who may be · 
· ·~oung enough to fall within the ·· 
~protection of the statute. Petitioner's 
··01argu111ent is without .merit. 4 ·cc1tations 
~ .. omitted.·] · ·;: ··· · , .. 
. :- .. 
· Affirmed•· .. · ·- ·. · 
. . . ' ~ .. , 
---
_.;.. 
~ •. People v. -Hernandez, 39 Cal.Rptr. 361, 393 P.2d ·a73 (1964)• 
3 •. -State v. Pulks, 83 S.D. 443, 436, -160 N.W.2d 418, 420 (1968)· 
4. Nelson•· lloriarty, 484 F.2d 1034.-. ~-~~5 ~!.c.-+ ~~ ... ~ !~7~\~ 
·see also 8 A.L.R.3d 1100. 
r lfo. 18151 ·,~. -2-
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